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Abstract
This paper experimentally studies the effects of competition in an environment
where people’s actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that, in comparison
with no competition, the presence of competition does neither increase efficiency
nor does it yield any gains in earnings for the short side of the exchange relation.
Moreover, competition has a clearly negative impact on the disposition towards
others and on the experienced well-being of those on the long side. Since subjective
well-being improves only for those on the short side competition contributes to
larger inequalities in experienced well-being. All in all competition does not show
up as a positive force in our environment.
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1 Introduction
Economists have extensively studied many aspects of the effects of competition for
different contexts, as for markets for labor, financial capital, natural resources or com-
modities. From these studies a strong consensus in mainstream economics concerning
the effects of competition has emerged. The spur of competition is generally regarded
as the key ingredient for improving efficiency and welfare. The title of a recent piece on
competition in The Economist’s Economics Focus puts it in a nutshell: “Competition
is all” (December 6th, 2003, p. 74). This positive view of competition relies on two
important assumptions. Firstly, that preferences and well-being of economic agents are
independent of the institution under which the economic activities take place, ceteris
paribus, and, secondly, that complete contract enforcement is possible.
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the consequences of competition in an
incomplete contract environment. Our results strongly indicate that competition influ-
ences peoples’ subjective well-being and disposition towards others mainly negatively
without having positive effects on efficiency and welfare in a material sense.
Our study builds upon the idea that (social) preferences and tastes may not be
independent of the institutional environment. For instance, Bowles (1998), argues that
different kinds of institutions may affect values, tastes and personalities. A particularly
important issue he discusses is closely related to the concern about the effect that
competition can have on well-being. In his own words: “(...) there are significant
differences in the personality effects on participants in markets (...) for people on the
short side (...) and those on the long side of the market, some of which are simply
excluded from the exchange process, while others fear losing the transactions they have
secured.” (Bowles, 1998, p. 78) This statement suggests that people’s well-being is
influenced by the competitiveness of the environment and the side one is on in such an
environment.
In a similar vein, Rabin (1993, p. 1283) argues that “Welfare economics should
be concerned not only with the efficient allocation of material goods, but also with
designing institutions such that people are happy about the way they interact with
others.”
There are several reasons why it is important to investigate the relationship be-
tween competition and well-being. Well-being and happiness are undoubtedly central
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goals in human life. This by itself is a good reason for studying their relation to dif-
ferent economic institutions. Kahneman, Diener and Schwartz (1999) provide a wealth
of information about the importance of well-being. Recent overviews about research
into happiness and well-being and its relation to economics is provided by, e.g., Frey
and Stutzer (2002), Krueger (2005), and McFadden (2005). The concern for how the
environment affects people is also related to issues of procedural fairness. The degree
of competitiveness may be viewed as one aspect of the procedure under which inter-
action takes place. By now there is considerable evidence that supports the premise
that satisfaction with process and procedures is an important ingredient of human
motivation.1
Beyond these direct consequences of competition on well-being there are potentially
also derived consequences. As argued by Bowles (1998) the experience of competition
may have an effect on people’s social values. More specifically, interacting under com-
petition may change people’s disposition towards others and, in particular, towards
those individuals they have encountered in the interaction (and may meet again in
the future). These potential effects of competition have not received much attention
in economics, but need to be studied in order to get a more complete picture of the
impact of competition on economic and social life. We investigate both the direct as
well as the derived effects of competition on well-being.
The second building block of our study is motivated by the fact that many if not
most economic interactions are contractually incomplete. A stream of theoretical stud-
ies initiated by Akerlof’s (1970) seminal ‘Lemons Market’ paper has shown that com-
petition alone is not sufficient to guarantee allocative efficiency (e.g. Klein and Leﬄer,
1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Levin, 2003). Experimental studies of exchange situa-
tions with incomplete contracts have corroborated this view and, moreover, shown that
the validity of economic analysis based on standard assumptions of narrow selfishness
and rationality may be considerably limited (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993, 1998;
1Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), Barret-Howard and Tyler (1986), and Bies, Tripp and
Neale (1993) find that procedural information influences judgments of market exploitation. Charness
and Levine (2000) find that perceived fairness of a layoff is highly dependent on the manner in which
the layoff is implemented. Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (forthcoming) show that different random
procedures affect choice behavior. Frey, Benz and Stutzer (2002) outline a concept of procedural utility
and suggest how it can be fruitfully integrated into economics. For a summary of some of this literature
see Lind and Tyler (1988).
2
Fehr, Ga¨chter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Hannan, Kagel, and Moser,
2002; Brown, Falk, and Fehr, 2004; Brandts and Charness, 2004).
These studies have greatly increased our knowledge about the problems and possible
solutions of contractually incomplete exchange situations. However, there is still a lack
of knowledge and evidence of the effect of competition per se in incomplete contract
situations. With this study we contribute to filling this gap.
We use laboratory experiments to study, in a single incomplete contract environ-
ment, the effects of competition on efficiency and well-being in a material sense as well
as on subjects’ subjective well-being and their disposition towards others.
Our experiment is designed in a way that makes it possible to control for the effects
of competition as such. We compare subjects’ behavior in an experimental condition
in which competition is present with behavior in another condition where competition
is absent, while holding all the other aspects of the economic environment constant. In
our design it is completely transparent whether one is interacting under competition
or not. Competition appears in such a way that it is always clear who is on the long
and who on the short side of the interaction. As a cautionary note we want to stress,
that while our design captures the essential aspects of competitive rivalry, as defined
by Stigler (1987), who writes, that “competition is a rivalry between individuals (or
groups or nations), and it arises whenever two or more parties strive for something that
all cannot obtain” (p. 531), it naturally does not cover all potentially important aspects
of competition. In particular, we do not deal with the kind of full-fledged atomistic
competition that is often studied in economics. We also do not study other potentially
important features of competition like how it contributes to selecting alternatives that
are better ex-ante as, for instance, technically more efficient ones.
Another innovative feature of our design is that we collect data about people’s
subjective well-being and about their disposition towards others. We use the notion
subjective well-being similarly to Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin’s (1997) notion of ‘ex-
perienced utility’, which goes back to Bentham. As these authors we claim that sub-
jective well-being (or experienced utility) is both measurable and empirically distinct
from standard decision utility. The actual measurement consists of self-reports con-
cerning a general measure of the hedonic state experienced by our subjects, as well as
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concerning the intensities of experienced specific emotions.2 The dispositions towards
others is measured with a variant of the social value orientation test (Liebrand 1984),
which involves the allocation of real money.
We measure subjective well-being and the disposition towards others in both ex-
perimental conditions, i.e., with and without competition, which allows us to study
the impact of competition on these measures in a controlled way. In the environment
with competition we can also distinguish between well-being on the short and on the
long side of the interaction. We also study how subjective well-being and disposition
towards others in the different conditions are related to interaction success (monetary
earnings) in the incomplete contract environment.
We find that in our experimental representation of an environment with incomplete
contracting the very presence of competition does not show up as a positive force. In
our experiment competition does not lead to an increase of efficiency (in terms of total
earnings) and does not yield any material gains to the short side of the interaction.
In addition, it leads to lower subjective well-being for participants on the long side
of the interaction compared to those not subject to competition. Only the subjective
well-being of those on the short side is improved, implying that competition leads to
an increase in inequality in experienced utility. Moreover, competition has an adverse
impact on the disposition towards others of those on the long side.
An important question is whether the observed differences in subjective well-being
can be attributed to differences in earnings from the incomplete contract game. What
our data show is that earnings (differences) alone are not sufficient to explain the
differences in subjective well-being but that the environment itself and the role taken
in this environment are important, too. Finally, regression analysis shows that people’s
disposition towards others after the experience in the incomplete contract game is
differently affected, depending on their position. Generally, the disposition of agents
on the long side towards those on the short side deteriorates, independently of the
interaction success (earnings). Specifically, agents who are often excluded from trade
show little sensitivity in their disposition towards others with respect to interaction
success. It seems that they are frustrated by the exclusion and that the rare events
2According to Robinson and Clore (2002), self-reports are the most common and potentially the best
way to measure a person’s emotional experience. A recent account of the usefulness of such measures
of subjective well-being for policy evaluation is provided by Krueger (2005).
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where they are not excluded are insufficient to overcome this effect. This supports the
conjecture of Bowles (1998) concerning the “personality effects” of competition (see
quote above).
Note that it would be difficult to do our study on the basis of field data alone,
since in natural environments it would be impossible to find adequate data with the
desired variation in competitive conditions. It probably would have been even harder
to obtain controlled information about subjective well-being and disposition towards
others which, in addition, would also have had to be connected to the competitiveness
of the economic environment. In contrast, laboratory experiments make it possible to
generate this kind of evidence in a systematic manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present in detail our
experimental design and procedures. In Section 3 we present and discuss our results
and Section 4 contains some closing comments.
2 Design and Procedures
In our design competition takes place in a stylized representation of a situation with in-
complete contracting and repeated interaction between two fixed sides of a relationship.
Ongoing relationships, which are characteristic for many if not most market and orga-
nizational environments, are the natural context in which to study the issues at hand.
Such an environment opens the possibility for psychological effects of competition to
accumulate over time.3
Our experimental set-up consists of two treatments each of which has three parts. In
part 1 subjects make decisions in the circle-test, a task designed to elicit people’s initial
disposition towards others. Part 2 is a finitely repeated social dilemma game played
by a fixed group of subjects. In part 3, participants’ subjective general well-being and
experienced emotions are measured using a computerized self-assessment questionnaire.
This is followed by a second application of the circle test measuring subjects’ post-
interaction disposition towards others. Table 1 depicts the sequence of events. The
data from part 1 yield information to control for people’s baseline disposition towards
3For instance, Lawler, Yoon, Baker, and Large (1995) state that frequent exchange creates emotional
ties between the parties involved.
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Table 1: Sequence of events
0. General information → experiment consists of three parts
PART 1
1. Instructions for first circle test only
2. Circle test concerning random stranger
PART 2
3. Instructions for interactive game
in NCC in CC
4. Incomplete contract game in dyad Incomplete contract game in triad
PART 3
5. Measurement of general subjective well-being
6. Measurement of specific emotions
7. Instructions for second circle test
in NCC in CC
8. Circle test concerning Circle test concerning
partner and random stranger both interaction partners
others. Part 2 is where we observe interactive behavior under different conditions. Part
3 is where we measure the repercussions of what occurs in the interactive phase.
In the following we present each of these parts in detail. The two treatments
(conditions) differ mostly with respect to the interactive game played in part 2. We,
therefore, start with the description of this part.
Part 2 - The interactive game: In the No Competition Condition (hereafter NCC)
the repeated game in part 2 is played in a dyad, by a pair of fixed partners, labeled A
and B. In contrast, in the Competition Condition (hereafter CC), the game involves a
triad of fixed players with fixed roles: A, B and C.4
In both the NCC and the CC the number of repetitions (rounds) is 30. In each
round of the game in the CC the subject in the role of A has to choose to play either
with B or with C. Since player A can only choose one of the other two players the
situation of players with roles B and C is one of competition as defined by Stigler
(1987) (see quote in the Introduction). Thus, the situation in the CC incorporates in
a simple way the presence of competition we want to study.
4A related game is studied in Davis and Holt (1994).
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The stage game of the repeated social dilemma game implemented in part 2 is
shown in Figure 1. The representation corresponds directly to the NCC condition,
where the game is played by two fixed partners, A and B. In each round the two
players simultaneously choose between the numbers 0 and 10. The choice possibilities
represent ‘cooperation’ and ‘no cooperation’ in a social dilemma situation and may be
interpreted as, e.g., wage and effort choices in a gift-exchange framework or quality and
price choices in markets of experience goods. Below, we refer to the choices as (rates
of) cooperation. The CC condition involves one more choice for one of the players. In
each round of the CC, player A also chooses between two partners, B and C. Player A
and the chosen partner then play the above game while the not chosen player obtains a
fixed payment of 90 points.5 Note that at the outset the B and C players are identical.
0 10
0 160, 160 410, 40
10 40, 410 290, 290
In CC the player not chosen receives 90.
Figure 1: The stage game
The fact that both A and the chosen partner can freely choose their action in a round
represents an incompleteness of contracting on both sides of the business relation. We
consider this to be more interesting than the case of one-sided incompleteness in which
one side’s responsibilities are completely fixed. It also makes the players symmetric
with respect to the choice possibilities. This is a desirable feature because we want
to isolate the effect of competition from possible influences related to choice or payoff
asymmetries. This is also the reason why the stage game is symmetric with respect to
the payoffs. The symmetric set-up facilitates a straightforward comparison of behavior
and earnings across different conditions and player types.
5Note that the outside payoff is dominated by the payoffs that a B or C player can obtain if he is
chosen by A and chooses 0. However, the outside payoff is higher than what one gets if one chooses 10
and the A player 0. In terms of a business relation the situation can be interpreted as one in which
for firms B and C it is worse to contribute to the relation and being taken advantage of than no to get
the contract with A at all. Another possible interpretation is a hold-up problem with opportunistic
behavior of the employer after a relation specific investment of the employee. In this case, the payoff
of 90 can be interpreted as the ex-ante outside opportunity of the employee.
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In the experiments, subjects in the role of B and C made their choice before they
knew whether they had been chosen by A. This procedure yields a more complete
picture of behavior than a sequential choice set-up and also allows us to compare the
behavior of matched and unmatched players.6 Subjects’ information depended on the
role they were in: In each round, player A was only informed about the choice of the
selected player and the B or C player was only informed of A’s choice if he had been
selected. In our view, this information structure is quite natural since in many business
and other economic exchange situations the terms of the implicit contract are typically
not revealed to third parties.
In our design the presence or absence of competition is an exogenously given feature,
which facilitates the analysis of the effects of competition as such. The fact that there
is only one player on the short side of the exchange relation is an additional advantage
of our environment, for the following reason. At all times, it is transparent to all three
players in a triad whether B or C is unmatched. If after a period of interaction an A
player switches away from, say, the B player then the latter player will be unmatched
with certainty in the next round.7 If there were more than two players on the long
side, then the issue would arise whether to inform unmatched players about which of
the players had been matched. This information could have an influence on behavior,
a possibility we want to avoid.
In our setting the advantageous position of the A player is obvious. Actually, the
B and C players can be seen as being at A’s mercy, since they do not have a proper
refusal possibility. Examples of such situations are the competition between workers
for being selected by a superior for a promotion or cases of procurement where several
firms compete offering similar inputs. One might also think of situations in smaller
towns or at the workplace, where turning down a work-related or business proposal is
socially very difficult. Recall, that in our setting the chosen player on the long side can
guarantee himself a payoff higher than the outside option payoff. In this sense, it is
always better to trade than not to trade.
6The procedure has an additional advantage. The alternative of letting A select a partner before
the simultaneous play of the stage game could have influenced behavior of the B/C players (see, e.g.,
Brandts, Gu¨th, and Stiehler, forthcoming). This is an interesting effect but is separate from the issue
we are interested in here. Note, that our procedure is also related to Selten’s (1967) strategy method.
7For the CC the whole situation evokes the notion of unemployment being used as a disciplining
device; see Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
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The game-theoretic predictions based on the standard assumption of (common
knowledge of) rationality and narrow material self-interest differ across the two treat-
ments. For the NCC the prediction is straightforward. Since the stage game has the
incentive structure of a prisoners’ dilemma game both players choose 0 in the unique
Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the repeated game has also only one Nash equilibrium,
which is subgame-perfect: both players choose 0 in each round.
For the CC the standard predictions are rather different. The stage-game now
has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies in which all three players involved choose
action 0. The only difference between them is whether A chooses B or C as partner.
Importantly, however, the two equilibria are not payoff-equivalent. As a consequence,
our finitely repeated CC game also has multiple Nash equilibria and some of them are
subgame-perfect. One subgame-perfect equilibrium involves all three players choosing
the non-cooperative choice in every round. However, there are also numerous other
subgame-perfect equilibria involving different levels of stable relations between player
A and his partners and different degrees of gains from cooperation for players.8 The
theoretical prediction of multiple equilibria with and without gains from cooperation
in our CC is akin to the findings of MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). They show that
in repeated labor relations with incomplete effort enforcement many equilibria exist.
Some of them involve cooperation with rent extraction whereas others are equivalent
to the competitive Walrasian outcome without any rents.
8For illustration, consider the following set of subgame perfect equilibria all involving one of the
players on the long side, say C, always defecting and A choosing B as a partner. In the first k1 rounds
A and B both cooperate, in the second k2 rounds A defects and B cooperates and in final k3 rounds
both A and B defect, where k1 < k2 < k3, k1 + k2 + k3 = 30. In case of a deviation by A, B changes to
defection in all remaining rounds. In case of a deviation by B, A switches to choosing C as partner and
defects in all subsequent rounds. (We are grateful to Aljazˇ Ule for providing us with this example.)
The punishment corresponding to switching to the other player is credible. Indeed, the described
strategies prescribe that after any deviation all players follow the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
strategy. Note, that all of these equilibria involve all three players choosing the non-cooperative action
0 in the last two rounds. To see this, observe that if, say, B is chosen in the last round he will earn 160,
because all players choose the non-cooperative action in that round, implying a gain of 70 relative to the
exclusion payoff of 90. This loss of 70 is smaller than the gain from a deviation in the previous round,
410− 290 = 120. Considering the last two rounds, however, it is clear that the one-time deviation gain
of 120 can not compensate for twice foregoing earnings of 70. This kind of analysis is akin to the one
suggested by Friedman (1985), Fraysse´ and Moreau (1985) and Benoit and Krishna (1985).
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What we wish to highlight here is that even under the standard game theoretic
assumptions there are subgame perfect Nash equilibria that imply considerable coop-
eration in the CC. The rivalry on the long side of the exchange situation turns the
repeated social dilemma into a coordination game. The question is whether compe-
tition helps players to coordinate on efficient equilibria. For instance, there is plenty
of experimental evidence that in competitive markets with complete contracts people
very quickly coordinate on the efficient Walrasian equilibrium (e.g., Davis and Holt,
1993). We are aware of the fact that these markets are different from our set-up in so
far no clear-cut game theoretic predictions are known for them. Nevertheless, it seems
a natural question to ask whether such an ‘invisible hand’ hand is also at work in a
competitive incomplete contract setting as implemented in our experiment. Since such
arguments can not be made for the NCC one may expect higher cooperation rates in
the CC than in the NCC.9
Social or other-regarding preferences can transform the social dilemma games into
coordination games in both conditions and can therefore lead to cooperation in the CC
as well as the NCC. For instance, with the type of distributional preferences posited by
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) both our stage games can have an equilibrium without cooperation, but also
have equilibria in which some subjects cooperate while others defect.10 The possibility
of cooperation in the repeated versions of the NCC game follows straightforwardly. In
the repeated CC game the pattern of cooperation may depend on whether players only
care about the distribution of payoffs between themselves and their chosen partners, or
9The discrepancies in the predictions for the two conditions can also be compared to those for an
analogous pair of situations with a fixed surplus to be divided. The Nash demand game can, due to its
symmetry, be seen as the fixed surplus game parallel to the NCC stage game. Although, any division
of the surplus is a Nash equilibrium in the demand game, the equal split seems to be a reasonable
prediction, and this is what was found in the experiments reported in Nydegger and Owen (1975).
The same situation involving two buyers is an auction with secret reserve price where the only Nash
equilibrium implies the whole surplus going to the seller. Here competition clearly favors the short
side of the market. Gu¨th, Marchand and Rulliere (forthcoming) present experimental evidence from
an ultimatum game with responder competition in which the proposer actually obtains almost all the
surplus. Roth, Prasnikar, Okuwo-Fujiwara and Zamir (1991) find similar results in a Bertrand-type
auction.
10Other models of social preferences like Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher
(1998) and Charness and Rabin (2002) predict similar patterns.
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whether they also take into account the unmatched player. In the first case, equilibrium
cooperation could involve a stable relation between player A and one of the other
two, whereas in the case in which third party payoffs are also relevant some degree of
switching between the two players would be involved.11
In summary, for the games just discussed theory suggests a plethora of possible types
of behavior implying that theoretical reasoning alone gives us an incomplete picture
about the allocative and distributional effects of competition. Our experimental results
will help to complement this view.
Part 1 - Initial disposition towards others: In part 1, prior to the interaction
phase just described, we recorded participants’ decisions in the circle test, which is
a modified version of the ring-test (Liebrand, 1984) and was successfully applied by
Sonnemans, van Dijk and van Winden (forthcoming). It is a task which allows for a
quantification of people’s disposition towards others by determining the readiness of
individuals to help or hurt others at some cost to themselves.
In the circle-test a person’s disposition towards another person is measured by a
decision which consists in the selection of a point on a circle. Figure 2 shows the
circle test used in part 1 of both treatments. Each point on the circle represents an
allocation of points to the person who makes the choice (S) and to another person (O).
The amounts allocated can be positive or negative, with S2 + O2 = 10002. Each point
on the circle also corresponds to a certain angle.12 It is possible to choose S = 1000
and O = 0. Other choices of O lead to S < 1000. Importantly, in the experiment these
numbers translate into money earnings at the exchange rate of 1000 points equal to
e 2,30 (≈ US $ 2,50 when the experiment was conducted). Hence, decisions in the
circle-test have pecuniary consequences.
In both treatments subjects had to make circle-test decisions with respect to other
subjects. Before the interactive phase of part 2 began and before even knowing the
content of this phase, thus also not knowing whether they were in the NCC or the CC
11The reputation formation model of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) can also explain
cooperation in both the NCC and the CC conditions.
12The circle appeared on subjects’ computer screen. Subjects received computerized instructions
about how to make the decision and had ample opportunity to practice. The angles that subjects could
choose were positive (negative) for the cases where the other player obtains some positive (negative
amount).
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Translation:
Choose a point on the
circle.
Use the mouse. The but-
tons are for precision.
The “other” is arbitrar-
ily chosen.
for myself:
for the other:
Confirmation
Figure 2: The circle test in part 1
condition, each subject chose an angle with respect to one anonymously and randomly
chosen other subject. These initial angles towards a stranger measure the ‘social value
orientation’ or the disposition towards generalized others. Subjects were not informed
about the decision of ‘their’ strangers in the circle test until the very end of the session.
Part 3 - Post-interaction well-being and disposition towards others: In part 3
of the experiment we measured the effects of the interaction in the incomplete contract
game on subjects’ subjective well-being and emotions as well as their dispositions to-
wards others.
After the last round of the interactive game, and without knowing beforehand, sub-
jects had to respond to a computerized questionnaire designed to elicit participants
subjective well-being. They were asked to rate themselves with respect to a general
subjective well-being indicator as well as with respect to thirteen specific emotions.13
The questionnaire used has previously successfully been applied by Bosman and van
Winden (2002). We explain the general measure of subjective well-being and the emo-
tions questionnaire in detail when we present the results on subjective well-being in
Section 3.2.
13For more general discussions about the role and importance of feelings and emotions in economic
contexts see Loewenstein (2000), Lawler and Thye (1999) and Elster (1998).
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Right after answering the questionnaires subjects had to make two new circle-test
decisions. In the CC each subject chose angles relative to each of the two other subjects
in the triad. In the NCC each subject made one choice relative to his partner and - to
keep the number of decisions constant across treatments - another choice relative to a
randomly chosen third subject, a stranger.
We hypothesize that the intensity of the emotions as well as the disposition towards
others will be be related to experience and interaction success during the interactive
part as well as the role and institution subjects are immersed in. We will report on
the measures of subjective well-being and disposition towards others as well as their
relation to interaction success and the institution in part 2 of the experiment.
We collected data for 153 subjects. Each subject participated in only one ses-
sion. We conducted four CC sessions with 81 subjects in 27 triads. For the NCC
72 subjects participated in 36 dyads in four NCC sessions. We have, therefore, 26
[36]14 and 27 statistically independent observations. All sessions were run computer-
ized at the CREED laboratory at the University of Amsterdam. The average (net of
show-up fee) earnings per subject was e 23,– (≈ US $20,–). A typical session lasted
approximately 90 minutes. The instructions of the experiment can be downloaded from
‘http://www.fee.uva.nl/creed/pdffiles/instr2compwellbe.pdf’.
3 Results and regularities
We first present the results from the different parts of our design separately. In Sec-
tion 3.1 we present the results pertaining to the social dilemma games, concentrating
on questions of efficiency and earnings. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we report the results
concerning subjects’ experienced well-being and emotions and their disposition towards
others, respectively. In Section 3.4 we relate the data generated in the different parts of
the experiment to each other. Particularly, we explain how post-interaction well-being
and disposition towards others depends on earnings and other features, like competi-
tiveness, of the interaction phase. We formulate our main findings in terms of a number
of specific results as well as in terms of some more qualitative regularities.
14For the NCC we have complete data for only 52 participants (26 pairs). For the other 20 participants
we have all information except the decisions in the first circle test. This was due to computer problems
in one of the NCC sessions.
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3.1 Competition, efficiency and earnings
Figure 3 shows the development of average cooperation rates over the 30 rounds for
both the CC and the NCC, which also represents attained efficiency levels in terms of
earnings. Recall that 10 is the cooperative choice and 0 the non-cooperative one.
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Figure 3: Development of the level of cooperation (efficiency) in NCC and CC
For the NCC cooperation levels are the average over the two involved players
(dyads), while for the CC we distinguish between across groups (triads) - the aver-
age cooperation level of all three players A, B and C - and across plays - the average
cooperation level involving only A players and the actually chosen B or C players. For
all three series no large variations across rounds are observed, except for a rather stark
end-game effect.15 We focus on the comparison of cooperation levels across treatments.
Result 1
A. There is no difference between cooperation levels in the NCC and in the actual plays
in the CC.
B. The cooperation levels in the NCC are (marginally) larger than the cooperation levels
across triads in the CC.
For NCC the average cooperation level is 7.04 and the standard deviation is 3.39,
while for the CC across plays the corresponding values are 6.71 and 3.06. The Mann-
15Such an end-game effect has been found in many other experiments on public goods and social
dilemma games. It does not affect our treatment effects.
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Whitney test16 does not reject the hypothesis of equal average levels (p = .2001). Across
the triads in the CC the average cooperation level is 6.12 and the standard deviation
2.87. In this case the Mann-Whitney test detects a marginally significant difference
(p = .0524).17
The above result shows that in our experiment competition does not lead to more
efficiency in terms of earnings and, hence, that competition is not a very successful
coordination device in the CC. At the same time, results 1A and 1B together indicate
that actual pairings seem to be important. Below we will unveil what is behind this
feature of the data.
Another interesting issue is whether in the CC the long side or the short side of the
exchange relation cooperates more. Intuition may suggest that player A may sometimes
take advantage of his position of power, behave opportunistically and that this may be
the main source of inefficiency. Recall, that such opportunistic behavior can be part of
an equilibrium strategy. Connected to this issue is the question whether the short or
the long side earns more.
Result 2 refers to the earnings levels of the players in the different roles providing an
answer to the question whether the short side can extract rents due to the competition
on the long side.
Result 2
A. There is no difference in average earnings between A players in the CC and players
in the NCC.
B. There is no difference in average earnings between the selected B or C players in the
CC and NCC players.
C. The standard deviation of A’s earnings across rounds in the CC is larger than for
players in the NCC.
In the NCC the average earnings per round were 252.2 and in the CC the A players’
average earnings per round were 251.6. A Mann-Whitney test testing the equality of
these earnings yields p = .2659 (Result 2A). The average per round earnings of the
chosen B/C players were 238.7. (Note, that these earnings are calculated on the basis
16If not otherwise indicated all tests are two-tailed and the unit of observation is the group.
17All results remain qualitatively the same when the last two rounds are excluded.
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that a B/C player is chosen and do not include the outside payoff of 90.) Comparing
these B/C players’ earnings to the per round earnings of players in NCC yields p = .1960
(Mann-Whitney test) which supports Result 2B. The standard deviation of earnings
across rounds and across A and B players in NCC is 65.43 (n=72). For A players
in CC the standard deviation of earnings across rounds is 89.59 (n=27). A Mann-
Whitney test shows that this difference is highly significant (p = .0079). This supports
part C of the above result. Similarly, significant results are obtained when comparing
A players’ standard deviations in earnings in CC with those of A and B players in the
NCC separately. The earnings per round of the B/C players who have been chosen
more (less) often as an interaction partner amounted to 216.4 (116.5). Note, that these
earnings include the outside payoff of 90 when not chosen.
One can interpret Result 2 as having negative implications for the allocation of
resources. The fact that in many exchange environments the short side obtains a large
part of the available surplus is usually considered to have the allocative virtue of attract-
ing resources to that side. This incentive seems not to be present in our environment,
if one compares the short side’s earnings with that of the NCC. In addition, the fact
that the standard deviation of earnings is higher for the A players in the CC than in
the NCC shows that being on the short side in the CC is not such a favorable position
as one might expect intuitively and theoretically. Competition leads to more income
uncertainty for agents on the short side of the exchange relation.
Up to this point we have documented the fact that from a material perspective
competition does not increase efficiency nor does it favor the short side. We have not
yet studied whether player A’s actual use of the possibility of changing his partner
affects A’s earnings. Figure 4 plots the earnings per play of the A players with the
more often chosen B/C player (panel (a)) and the earnings of the more often chosen
B/C player (panel (b)) against the actual number of plays. The broken horizontal line
indicates the median number of plays, which is 22. The minimum of this variable is 15
rounds and 30 rounds the maximum. As can be seen from the simple linear regression
lines there is a clear positive relationship between earnings and the number of plays.
This visual impression is corroborated by Spearman rank order statistics (see Figure 4).
To further characterize the relationship between earnings per play and the number of
plays we calculate the average earnings above and below (or equal) the median number
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Figure 4: Earnings (per play) of A and the more often chosen B/C player
in CC as a function of the number of plays
of plays between A players and more often chosen B/C players. These earnings are
depicted in Figure 4, above and below the broken horizontal line. They show that
players with (strictly) above median length relationships earn more than those with
relationships shorter than 22. Mann-Whitney tests indicate that these differences in
earnings are statistically significant (p = .0066 and p = .0031 for A players and more
often chosen B/C players, respectively). The results are qualitatively the same when
we look at earnings per round instead of per play.
Result 3 The number of times an A player chooses the same partner correlates posi-
tively with A’s earnings. Similarly, for those B/C players who are chosen more often,
the number of times they are chosen correlates positively with their earnings.
An interesting question is how a stable relation is established. It turns out that
first round behavior is important. An OLS regression of the total number of plays with
the partner chosen in the first round as dependent variable finds strongly significant
positive coefficients for A’s first round decision (.953, p = .005) as well as for the
partner’s first round decision (1.212, p = .003) with an insignificant intercept (2.725,
p = .499). Initial cooperative behavior, including that of the A player, has a strong
positive influence on the stability of a relation.
For the less often chosen B/C player a similar positive relationship between number
of plays with A and earnings is found when we look at earnings per round, instead of
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per play. (Spearman’s ρ = .4941, p = .0121). The median number of plays is 8. The
earnings per round for less often chosen B/C players with strictly more than eight plays
is 128.4, for those with less or equal to eight plays it is 109.6 (excluding those two who
have never been chosen). A Mann-Whitney test shows that this difference in earnings
is significant (p = .0440).18
Finally, it is interesting to note that the more often chosen players earn significantly
more per play than the less often chosen ones. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test yields that
the difference in earnings is statistically significant (p < .001).
Our evidence shows that in CC, for player A, relying on a more bilateral relation
is the most promising way to behave. However, even the relatively successful group
of A-players with above median stable relations does not earn significantly more than
subjects in the NCC (p = .8382, Mann-Whitney test). That is, compared to the
situation without competition, in the CC players on the short-side do not profit from
choosing one of the players for a long-term relation. For the A’s with less than the
median number of plays with the same partner, the result that they earn less than
subjects in NCC is marginally significant (p = .0696, Mann-Whitney test).19
An interesting question emerging from the above results is, why can the A player
not profit from the rivalry between B and C? Especially, in light of the arguments put
forward in Section 2 where it is was shown that large gains by A can be sustained
even in subgame perfect Nash equilibria The answer may be due to A’s punishment
behavior, in general, and partner choice behavior, in particular. If A could commit to
always changing his trading partner after the partner choosing 0 and never switching
18The positive relationship between earnings and number of plays breaks down for the less often
chosen players when looking at earnings per play. We actually find a significantly negative correlation
between the number of rounds chosen and the earnings per play (Spearman’s ρ = −.3999, p = .0476).
This result is driven by the fact that some of the less often chosen players free-ride on cooperative
A-players in early rounds and A players then do not choose them any more. This drives up the average
per play earnings of these free-riders.
19Kollock (1994) and Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) also find that in stylized incomplete contracting
situations people tend to create bilateral relations. In accordance with our findings, the latter also find
that longer relations generate larger rents and that early round behavior is an important determinant
of the length of the relation. These authors, however, do not investigate the impact of competition, i.e.
they do not study whether bilateral relations in the presence of competition lead to different outcomes
than in the absence of competition.
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after the partner choosing 10, then he might be able to capitalize on his advantageous
position. However, since this commitment is not possible in our environment, B and
C can not be sure of how A will behave. This uncertainty about A’s future behavior,
typical of incomplete contracts environments, may lead them to act opportunistically,
choosing 0 even after successful cooperation in a round. In consonance with this, A
may sometimes switch away from a partner who chose 10. All this could lead to a
dilution of A’s apparently advantageous situation.
To save on space, we elaborate on this issue in this and the following paragraph
only briefly. The tables on which the results are based can be found in the Appendix.
As suggested in the previous paragraph we find that A’s rewarding and punishment
behavior is indeed not completely consistent. If both, the A player and the chosen
partner, make the cooperative choice 10 in a round t− 1 the A player does not reward
the partner in 59 out of 455 cases. That is, in 13% of all instances player A does not
stay and cooperate with the same partner in round t. Similarly, if the chosen B/C
player does not cooperate in a round t−1 the A player does not punish this behavior in
14 out of 74 cases. That is, in 19% of all instances A players do not sanction defecting
partners by also defecting or switching to the other B/C player in round t (see Table 9
in the Appendix).
Another mode of behavior that is likely to increase efficiency and earnings is tit-for-
tat play or conditional cooperative behavior. Here we find that compared to the NCC
the behavior of A in the CC is less conditionally cooperative. A choice of 0 (10) by A in
a round t following the partner’s choice of 0 (10) in round t−1 is significantly less likely
in the CC than in the NCC. The frequencies of such choices in the CC and the NCC
are .723 (.828) and .797 (.926), respectively. According to χ2-tests these differences
of the relative frequencies across conditions are significant at least at the 5 percent
level. Interestingly, in comparison to players with label B in the NCC, the B/C players
in the CC behave similarly to the A players: 0 (10) choices after 0 (10) choices are
significantly less frequent in the CC than in the NCC. χ2-tests comparing the relative
frequencies in the NCC and the CC yield p < .001 and p = .113 for choices of 0 and
10, respectively (see also Table 10 in the Appendix).
In summary, in the CC A players are not consistently sanctioning defecting behav-
ior of their chosen partners and the propensity to behave conditionally cooperative is
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weaker in the CC than in the NCC. Together, these facts suggest that the cooperative
climate is not to better in the CC than in the NCC; perhaps it is even worse.
In this section we have looked at the impact of competition in the interaction phase
in isolation. We summarize the results in our first regularity.
Regularity 1 From an earnings perspective competition does neither increase effi-
ciency nor favor the short side of the exchange relation.
In Section 3.4 below, we will relate these results to our measures of subjects’ experienced
well-being and their behavioral disposition towards others, which will be discussed in
the next two sections.
3.2 Subjective well-being after the interaction
We use both a general measure as well as a list of specific emotions to elicit subjects’
subjective (experienced) well-being. Our general measure of subjective well-being is
shown in Figure 5. After the interaction phase, subjects were asked to mark the number
that best corresponded to their general mood in relation to the facial expressions of the
so-called Self-Assessment Manikin.20
Figure 5: General measure of subjective well-being
In the figure, a “1” clearly corresponds to the highest level and a “9” to the lowest
level of subjective well-being. In the reported measure that we use below we have
inverted the score obtained from subjects’ decisions in Figure 5, so that “1” is the
minimum and “9” the maximum, to make it more easily comparable to the emotions
scores reported below. Table 2 shows in the third row (labeled ‘general well-being’)
20These figures, developed by Lang (1980), are reprinted from Sonnemans (1991).
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Table 2: Averages of specific emotion scores and general measure
of subjective well-being across conditions and roles
condition-role
well-being/emotion CC-A CC-B/C m.o. CC-B/C l.o. NCC
general well-beinga,b,c,d,f 7.85 6.09 3.50 6.40
sadnessa,b,c,e,f 1.93 2.70 4.07 2.06
happya,b,c,d,f 5.04 4.26 3.00 4.07
shamea 2.11 1.54 2.28 1.82
prideb,c,f 3.78 4.00 2.78 3.75
feara,e 1.48 2.04 2.04 1.61
envya,b,e,f 1.85 3.15 3.67 2.43
reliefb,c,f 3.59 3.70 2.48 3.47
angerb,c,f 2.07 2.80 4.46 2.75
joyb,c,d,f 4.74 4.19 2.56 3.75
guilt 2.00 2.02 2.32 1.68
irritationa,b,d,f 2.26 3.37 4.44 3.26
surprisef 3.37 3.48 4.33 3.28
contemptb,f 2.04 3.17 3.76 2.44
no. of obs 27 27 27 72†
Note: Scores for the individual emotions range from 1 (“not at all” experienced)
to 7 (“very intense” experienced) and scores for well-being range from 1 (feel
“very bad”) to 9 (feel “very good”). “m.o.” (“l.o.”) stands for “more (less) often
chosen”. a significant difference between CC-A and CC-B/C m.o., b significant
difference between CC-A and CC-B/C l.o., c significant difference between CC-
B/C m.o. and CC-B/C l.o., d significant difference between CC-A and NCC,
e significant difference between CC-B/C m.o. and NCC, f significant differ-
ence between CC-BC l.o. and NCC; all significances at least at 5 percent level,
Mann-Whitney rank sum tests, two-tailed; † for pride n = 71 due to one missing
observation.
the average values of the measure for the different conditions and roles of players. Our
primary interest lies in differences across the NCC and the CC and across the different
player positions within the CC. Result 4 summarizes these differences.
Result 4
A. For the NCC players general subjective well-being is lower than for the A players in
the CC and higher than for the less often chosen B/C players in the CC.
B. General subjective well-being is not different between the NCC players and the more
often chosen B/C players in the CC.
C. In the CC, general subjective well-being is higher for the A players than for the B/C
players.
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D. In the CC, general subjective well-being is lower for the less often chosen than for
the more often chosen B/C players.
Support for this result can be found in Table 2. In the table the superscripts indicate
significant differences of pairwise comparisons across player situations and conditions.
For our general measure of subjective well-being all pairwise comparisons appear to
be significant at least at the 5 percent level, with only one exception. (There is no
significant difference between players in the NCC and the more often chosen B/C
players in the CC.) Note, that in the CC the levels of our general measure of subjective
well-being are different between all three player situations. Being on the short or
long side does make a difference for subjective well-being. Those on the long side feel
significantly worse than players on the short side. Moreover, being mostly excluded on
the long side has an additional negative impact on subjective well-being. Observe also
that, in comparison to the NCC, the reported scores of our general measure in the CC
are at a higher, a lower and a similar level, depending on the position of the players.
Hence, competition has led to an inequality in subjective well-being without generating
material efficiency gains. Note also that average scores of our general measure of
subjective well-being across all players in the CC is with 5.81 lower than for subjects
in the NCC, where it is 6.40, although not significantly so (p = .1884).
Next to the general measure of subjective well-being subjects also reported the
experienced intensity of a a number of specific emotions. Besides more specific infor-
mation on the emotional state of the players this provides us also with a check of our
general measure. We expect that negative (positive) emotions are negatively (posi-
tively) correlated with our global measure. Table 3 shows these correlations between
our general measure and the individual emotions. The positive emotions happiness,
pride, joy, and relief indeed show a significantly positive correlation with our general
measure of subjective well-being. The negative emotions sadness, envy, anger, irrita-
tion, and contempt turn out to be clearly negatively correlated with our measure. In
summary, subjects reporting higher subjective well-being, in the global measure, also
report higher scores on positive and lower scores on negative emotions. This supports
the interpretation that our global measure indeed measures how people feel and also
demonstrates the close relation between subjective well-being in a more general sense
and the intensity of experienced specific emotions.
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Table 3: Correlation of emotions with general
measure of subjective well-being
correlation correlation
emotion coefficient emotion coefficient
sadness -.5997* anger -.6915*
(.0000) (.0000)
happiness .7319* joy .7579*
(.0000) (.0000)
shame -.0568 guilt -.0234
(.4852) (.7740)
pride .4013* irritation -.6489*
(.0000) (.0000)
fear -.0902 surprise -.2635*
(.2673) (.0010)
envy -.4401* contempt -.4374*
(.0000) (.0000)
relief .3563*
(.0000)
n = 153†
Note:
∗ denotes a statistically significant correlation co-
efficient; p-values in parentheses; † ... for pride n = 152
due to one missing observation.
Table 2 shows, from the forth row onwards, the average intensity of each of the
specific emotions for each position in the interaction phase of the two conditions. In
view of the findings concerning the general well-being and its relation with the spe-
cific emotions the observed patterns seem quite natural. Pairwise comparisons of the
emotion scores between players’ positions leads to the following result.
Result 5 After the incomplete contract game:
A. The A players in the CC appear to be in a better emotional state than the NCC
players.
B. The less often chosen B/C players in the CC are in a worse emotional state than
the NCC players.
C. In the CC the A players exhibit a better emotional state than the B/C players.
D. In the CC the less often chosen B/C players are in a much worse emotional state
than the A players and the more often chosen B/C players.
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Statistical support for this result can be found in Table 2 where the superscripts at the
emotion names indicate significant differences in the pairwise comparisons across condi-
tions and player roles. In relation to Result 5A subjects in the NCC report significantly
lower levels of the positive emotions happiness and joy and a significantly higher level
of the negative emotion irritation than the A players in the CC (see superscript d).
Concerning Result 5B, the less often chosen B/C players report significantly higher
intensities of the negative emotions sadness, envy, anger, irritation, and contempt and
significantly lower intensities of the positive emotions happiness, pride, relief, and joy
than players in the NCC (see superscript f ). Concerning Result 5C, the A players
report a significantly higher intensity of happiness and significantly lower intensities
of sadness, envy, and irritation than both the more and less often chosen B/C players
(see superscripts a and b). Regarding, Result 5D, the less often chosen B/C players
report significantly higher intensities of the negative emotions sadness and anger and
significantly lower intensities of the positive emotions happiness, pride, relief, and joy
than both the A players and the more often chosen B/C players (see superscripts b
and c).
In summary, the evidence presented in this section documents that there exists a
clear relation between people’s subjective well-being and their position in the incom-
plete contract game. In particular, being on the long side in the CC reduces their
subjective well-being, which is reinforced for those often excluded from the interaction.
3.3 Disposition towards others before and after the interaction
Table 4 presents the averages and standard deviations of the angles observed in the
circle tests of parts 1 and 3, distinguishing the NCC from the CC. For the CC we also
distinguish between player types and, for the B/C players, between more and less often
chosen ones. Previous use of social value orientation tests in economic experiments,
as for instance in Offerman, Sonnemans, and Schram (1996), has shown that a large
fraction of people give positive amounts to others before any interaction has taken
place, evidencing positive sentiments towards strangers.
Focus first on initial angles on the left part of Table 4. Recall, that these were
recorded before subjects were informed about the content of any of the remaining
parts of the experiment. Hence, these angles can not be affected by behavior or even
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Table 4: Disposition towards others - average angles in the circle tests
initial angle of final angle of
all all A A B/C-m.o. B/C-m.o. B/C-l.o. B/C-l.o.
all A B/C B/C-m.o. B/C-l.o. towards towards towards towards towards towards towards towards
(all) partner third party B/C-m.o. B/C-l.o. A B/C-l.o. A B/C-m.o.
NCC 15.37 10.67 9.68
(18.40) (24.17) (15.49)
[n=52]a [n=52]c [n=52]c
CC 14.01 14.90 13.58 19.20 7.96 14.54 6.93 12.49 12.59 -4.19 5.95
(26.03) (19.43) (28.83) (21.99) (33.81) (20.14) (14.40) (19.24) (16.79) (27.03) (13.61)
[n=80]b [n=26]b [n=54] [n=27] [n=27] [n=26]d [n=26]d [n=27] [n=27] [n=27] [n=27]
Note: “m.o.” (“l.o.”) stands for “more (less) often chosen; a observations of one session are missing due to technical problems; b one missing observation; c without
observations that correspond to the missing observations in the first circle test (see a); d without observation that corresponds to the missing observation in the first
circle test (see b); in the three cases where both B/C players are chosen exactly 15 times the average angles of the two players is used when calculating the angles
for the “more often” and “less often” chosen players. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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by expectations about behavior in the incomplete contract game. The average initial
angles are 15.37 degrees in the NCC and 14.01 in the CC.21 The difference is statistically
not significant (p = .8032, Mann-Whitney test). In the CC, we also do not find a
statistically significant difference in initial angles between those subjects who became
an A player and those who became a B or C player. Interestingly, the initial angles of
the subsequently more and less often chosen B/C players (19.20 vs. 7.96 degrees) hint
towards a sorting out of the initially more selfish B/C players. However, this difference
is statistically not significant (p = .218, Mann-Whitney test), which is due to the large
standard deviation of the angles of the B/C-l.o..
Now consider the final angles shown on the right part of Table 4. These angles
were measured after the interaction phase and, hence are payoff relevant expressions of
post-interaction disposition towards others. Our main interest is in whether and how
competition and experience during the interaction phase affect people’s disposition
towards others. We, therefore, focus here on changes in the angles and not on their
levels. For both conditions we observe a general tendency for angles to decrease from
the pre-game to the post-game situation. Such a general ‘decay’ is in line with the
results of van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden (2002). More importantly, however,
the observed changes clearly differ across conditions and roles. The pattern of these
differences is summarized in the following result.
Result 6 In comparison to the disposition towards others measured before the incom-
plete contract game:
A. In the NCC, players’ disposition towards their partners do not change, whereas it
exhibits a decrease towards third parties.
B. In the CC, A players’ disposition towards the more often chosen partner does not
change, but decreases towards the less often chosen partner.
C. In the CC, the more often chosen B/C players’ disposition towards A does not
change, and decreases (marginally) towards their less often chosen counterpart.
D. In the CC, the less often chosen B/C players’ disposition towards A decreases, but
does not change towards their more often chosen counterpart.
In the NCC, the comparison of the initial angles (15.37) with the final angles towards
the partner (10.67) yields p = .1775 (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test). In contrast, the
21An angle of 15 degrees implies a transfer to the other person of approximately 260 points.
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initial angle is significantly different from the final angle towards the third party, which
is 9.68 (p = .0132, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test).
How does this compare to the pattern in the CC? Here we need to look both at A
and B/C players. As above, we distinguish again between more and less often chosen
B/C players. Part B of the above result captures the A players’ changes. The fact
that - compared to their initial disposition - they do not significantly modify their
disposition towards the more often chosen partner can be directly observed in Table 4
where A’s average initial angle is 14.90 and the average final angle towards the more
often chosen partner is 14.54 with very similar standard deviations. Concerning the
less often chosen partner the final angle decreases to 6.93 and a Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test indicates that this change is significant (p = .0203).
For the more often chosen B/C player the decrease in the angle from 19.20 (initial
angle) to 12.49 (final angle) towards the A player is statistically not significant (p =
.1650, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test). The decrease to 12.59 (final angle) regarding the
less often chosen B/C fellow player is statistically marginally significant according to a
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (p = .0552).
For the less often chosen B/C players the decrease in the angle from the initial value
of 7.96 to -4.19 (final angle) regarding the A player is statistically highly significant
(p = .0018, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test). Note, that the negative angle implies that,
on average, less often chosen B/C players actually gave up money in order to reduce
the earnings of A players. The decrease to 5.95 (final angle) towards more often chosen
B/C fellow players is statistically insignificant (p = .4178, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test).
In summary, compared to their initial disposition towards others subjects in the
NCC, who had to stay together for all 30 rounds, and subjects in the CC who interacted
often with each other show no significant decrease in their disposition regarding each
other. At the same time, in the NCC towards third parties a significant decrease in
the disposition is observed. Such a decrease is also observed in the CC between those
subjects who interacted relatively little with each other. A plausible interpretation of
these observations is that subjects suffer from a considerable baseline distress (leading
to some general decay in angles), and that, at the same time, they exhibit some specific
goodwill concerning only those they interacted with relatively often. We have seen
that the latter is related to success in the interaction. Thus, this result suggests that
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between those who had many (successful) interactions there also exists a good basis for
possible future interactions. At the same time the observations also indicate that with
less often chosen partners no good basis for future interaction might exist. We examine
the relation of interaction success and the disposition towards others in greater detail
in the next section.
Figure 6 summarizes the changes in disposition towards others for the two con-
ditions. Note, that the pattern of changes in the CC (panel (b)) can not be easily
reconciled with notions of inequality aversion. Both the A players and the more often
chosen - and, hence, successful - B/C players exhibit a decrease in the angle towards
the remaining unsuccessful B/C player, who also earned less. (Recall, that B/C-l.o.
players’ earnings are about 46% of the A players’ and 54% of the B/C-m.o. players’
earnings; see Section 3.1). If players were trying to settle accounts in terms of earnings
one should expect the opposite. The behavior of the less often chosen B/C can also
not be explained solely in terms of payoffs. Although the average final angle towards
A is negative (-4.19), meaning that A’s payoff is decreased, the average final angle
towards the more successful B/C players remains positive and does also not decrease
significantly.
We summarize our findings of this and the previous section in our second regularity.
A/B
partner third party
0 −
(a) Changes in the NCC
A
m.o. l.o.
0 −
m.o.
A l.o.
0 −/0
l.o.
A m.o.
− 0
(b) Changes in the CC
Legend: In the figure a ‘−’ (‘−/0’) indicates a statistically (marginally) significant decrease and
a ‘0’ indicates no statistically significant change; ‘m.o.’ and ‘l.o.’ stands for ‘more often chosen
B/C player’ and ‘less often chosen B/C player’, respectively.
Figure 6: Graphical representation of the changes in disposition towards others
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Regularity 2 Subjective well-being and the dispositions towards others are strongly
influenced by the interaction institution and the role in which a person participates in
the incomplete contract game. In particular, being on the long side of the exchange sit-
uation has a strong negative effect on players’ subjective well-being and their disposition
towards players on the short side.
3.4 What explains post-interaction well-being and disposition?
We have seen that both subjective well-being and disposition towards others are affected
by people’s position in the interaction phase. What remains to be discussed is what
causes these differences. We presume the following relations: (i) disposition towards
others after the interaction is affected by interaction success (earnings) and/or some key
emotions; (ii) in turn, the emotions are triggered by the experience in the incomplete
contract game which has two basic dimensions: interaction success and the treatment
and position a person was in.
We first analyze the effect of interaction success, defined as total earnings over
actual plays, on general subjective well-being and the different specific emotions. For
general well-being and each specific emotion we have run separate OLS regressions with
interaction success as explanatory variable. We discuss here the main results of these
estimations. The detailed results can be found in Tables 11-13 in the Appendix. For the
NCC players the central result is that general well-being as well as a number of positive
emotions (happiness and joy) and negative emotions (sadness, envy, anger, irritation,
and contempt) are strongly significantly related to interaction success. As one would
expect the correlation of interaction success with well-being and the positive emotions
is positive whereas these correlations are negative for negative emotions (Table 11 in
the Appendix). These regression results clearly indicate that the emotional state of
NCC players is strongly influenced by their earnings success in the incomplete contract
game.
The picture turns out to be quite different for subjects in the CC. For the A play-
ers general well-being is only marginally significantly positively related to interaction
success in plays with the more often chosen B/C player and insignificant regarding
interaction success with the less often chosen player. Of the specific emotions only
anger is correlated with interaction success in plays with both B/C players. Hence,
29
for players on the short side in the CC interaction success appears to have only little
influence on their emotional state and general subjective well-being (Table 12 in the
Appendix). For B/C players the influence of interaction success on subjective well-
being depends strongly on whether a player is more or less often chosen. For the more
often chosen B/C players general subjective well-being as well as the negative emotions
envy, anger, irritation, and contempt and the positive emotions happiness, relief, and
joy are strongly correlated with interaction success in the incomplete contract game. In
contrast, for the less often chosen B/C players neither general subjective well-being nor
any of the specific emotions exhibits a significant correlation with interaction success
(Table 13 in the Appendix).
Recall that players’ reported levels of general subjective well-being and emotion
intensities strongly depend on the environment and role players are in (see Section 3.2).
Together with the above reported asymmetries in the influence of interaction success
on subjective well-being we have a clear indication that the experience of competition
has an effect on subjective well-being that goes beyond the effect it has on material
payoffs.
Next we examine potential determinants of behavior in the circle-tests taken after
the experience with the incomplete contract game. This is especially interesting since
behavior in this circle test can be seen as an indicator of the individual’s future (i.e. after
the game) cooperation propensity. We examined three models of seemingly unrelated
regressions for both competition conditions and all player roles. In the models the
independent variables are the final angles and the explanatory variables are the initial
angle (initial disposition towards others) and the total earnings over plays (interaction
success) and/or a set of six specific emotions (reflecting the subjective well-being of
players).22
22First, note that our use of a limited set of positive and negative emotions as a measure of subjective
well-being is akin to the use of U-indexes as introduced by Krueger (2005). The main reason for using
specific emotions instead of indexes is that the former provide us with a finer measure. The six
included emotions - sadness, fear, guilt, surprise, contempt, and happiness - were selected on the basis
of a procedure designed with the following aims: (a) to facilitate the comparison of regression results
across conditions and player situations we wanted to use the same set of emotions in all estimations;
(b) for convenience the set should be small but still reflect the subjective well-being of the players;
here we also wanted to avoid correlations between the emotions used as explanatory variables. The
applied procedure was as follows. We first computed the (Spearman) correlation coefficients between
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Table 5 presents regression results pertaining to the players in the NCC. In this
case we need to distinguish between changes of disposition towards the partner and the
randomly chosen third player. The (a) equation pertains to the interaction partner in
the incomplete contract game and the (b) equation relates to the third player. In all
three models the initial disposition towards others is a significant positive determinant
of the final angles. Interestingly, interaction success (total earnings over plays) is never
significant, neither alone nor in combination with the emotions. In contrast, of the six
emotions, guilt, surprise and, especially, contempt do have a significant effect vis-a`-vis
the interaction partner (but not the third player). A statistical model comparison shows
that models 2 and 3 are preferred above model 1 (see, bottom of the table). Hence,
adding emotions does increase the explanatory power of the regressions whereas adding
interaction success does not. Taking also into account the result that the emotions of
players in the NCC are influenced by interaction success (see above and Table 11 in
the Appendix) the overall picture that arises is that in the NCC earnings trigger some
of the emotions which in turn, together with the initial disposition, determine people’s
post-interaction disposition towards their interaction partner. Note, that the effect of
earnings is only indirect and mediated by the emotions.
Table 6 shows analogous regression results for the A players in the CC. Here, in
all model specifications the (a) equations relate to the more often chosen B/C player
and the (b) equations to the less often chosen one. As for players in the NCC the
initial disposition towards others has a significantly positive effect whereas interaction
success (total earnings over plays) has no effect in all three models. The emotion
surprise has a significant effect in relation to both other players, sadness and happiness
with respect to the more often chosen partner and contempt with respect to the less
often chosen one. The statistical model comparisons show that including the emotions
players’ final angles and each of the emotions separately, for each of the four player situations. In this
way we eliminated three specific emotions (pride, envy and relief) which were in no case significant at
the 5% level. Then we considered the remaining clusters of different types of positive, negative, and
non-classified emotions: {joy, happiness}, {sadness, irritation, anger, contempt}, fear and surprise. For
these clusters we applied two additional criteria. The first was the correlation between the emotions
within a cluster (with p-values Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons). Secondly, an emotion
was selected only if it showed a significant correlation with final angles in both treatments. Since four
of the selected six emotions are highly correlated with our measure of general well-being (see Table 3)
this measure is not included in the set of explanatory variables.
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Table 5: Determinants of the final angles of A and B players in NCC
(Seemingly unrelated regressions)
A and B players towards each other (#a equations) and
unrelated third player (#b equations)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Initial .4870∗∗ .4601∗∗ .3926∗ .3910∗∗ .3937∗ .3910∗∗
angle (.003) (.000) (.014) (.000) (.014) (.000)
Interaction .0549 .0200
success (.320) (.751)
Sadness -1.499 1.034 -1.684 1.034
(.526) (.471) (.463) (.471)
Fear .5779 -3.223 .4419 -3.223
(.855) (.100) (.888) (.100)
Guilt 4.504∗ 2.296 4.612∗ 2.296
(.050) (.106) (.043) (.106)
Surprise 3.808∗ -.1007 3.780∗ -.1007
(.022) (.923) (.023) (.923)
Contempt -5.075∗∗ -.0354 -5.120∗∗ -.0354
(.007) (.976) (.006) (.976)
Happiness -.6068 2.3760 -.3247 2.3760
(.790) (.071) (.878) (.071)
Constant -10.43 2.602 -3.713 -6.678 .7016 -6.678
(.450) (.264) (.837) (.351) (.951) (.351)
R2 .1845 .2986 .3608 .3911 .3586 .3911
Na 52 52 52 52 52 52
Model comparisons Model 1 vs Model 2 Model 2 vs Model 3
LR χ2 23.20 .0100
p-value .0275 .7514
Note:
∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level. a one
missing initial angle observation due to technical problems in one session. The two
observations in which A has chosen the same partner for all 30 rounds are excluded.
p−values between parentheses.
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Table 6: Determinants of the final angles of A players in CC
(Seemingly unrelated regressions)
A player towards more often (#a equations) and
less often (#b equations) chosen B/C player
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Initial .4240∗ .1817 .4790∗∗ .3260∗∗ .4791∗∗ .2804∗
angle (.026) (.206) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.014)
Interaction -.0014 .0025 .0002 .0029
success (.501) (.313) (.918) (.148)
Sadness 8.733∗∗ 2.035 8.626∗∗ 3.383
(.002) (.320) (.001) (.075)
Fear -3.125 1.360 -3.059 .2368
(.343) (.572) (.345) (.921)
Guilt 4.462 -.6431 4.387 .6967
(.075) (.738) (.067) (.693)
Surprise 4.928∗∗ 3.309∗∗ 4.916∗∗ 3.146∗
(.004) (.006) (.004) (.013)
Contempt -.8142 3.658∗∗ -.7965 3.356∗
(.656) (.005) (.662) (.012)
Happiness 6.242∗ 1.504 6.267∗ 1.459
(.038) (.477) (.037) (.509)
Constant 17.58 1.318 -61.53∗∗ -33.64∗∗ -60.30∗∗ -30.89∗
(.213) (.792) (.004) (.008) (.001) (.018)
R2 .2012 .1051 .6142 .6270 .6137 .5926
Na 24 24 24 24 24 24
Model comparisons Model 1 vs Model 2 Model 2 vs Model 3
LR χ2 32.24 2.20
p-value .0013 .3336
Note:
∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level. a one
missing initial angle observation due to technical problems in one session. The two
observations in which A has chosen the same partner for all 30 rounds are excluded.
p−values between parentheses.
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significantly improves the estimation but interaction success does not (see bottom of
the table). Recall from above that the emotions of A players in the CC are not affected
by interaction success (see also Table 12 in the Appendix). Hence, for the A players in
the CC interaction success neither directly nor indirectly (via the emotions) influences
their final angles towards their interaction partners. In contrast, the emotional state
is an important direct determinant for the final disposition towards the interaction
partners on the short side of the exchange relation.
The regression results for the more often chosen B/C players in the CC are shown in
Table 7. Here the (a) equations refer to the A player and the (b) equations to the other
- less often chosen - B/C player. In all three models, there are important differences
between the (a) and the (b) regressions, reflecting the asymmetry of the relations with
the other two players. The initial disposition towards others (initial angle) is signifi-
cantly positive vis-a`-vis the less often chosen B/C player, but insignificant vis-a`-vis the
A player. In model 1 interaction success with the A player has a significantly positive
effect on the final angel towards this player. When adding the emotions (model 2) this
effect vanishes, however. Of the emotions, sadness and surprise are influencing the final
angle towards the A player and fear and happiness the final angle towards the less often
chosen B/C player. Interestingly, in all cases the emotions exhibit a negative sign. The
statistical model comparisons show that adding the emotions improve the estimations
marginally and removing interaction success has no significant effect at all.
A possible interpretation of the regression results pertaining to the A player is that
interaction success and the emotions carry a similar informational value for explaining
the more often chosen B/C players’ disposition towards the player on the short side.
Additionally, since the significant emotions (sadness and surprise) are not correlated
with interaction success (see above and Table 13 in the Appendix) these two forces seem
to be independent from each other. With respect to the less often chosen B/C player
the baseline disposition towards others together with the emotional state determines
the final angle towards this player.
Table 8 shows the regression results for the less often chosen B/C players. Here
the (a) equations concern the A player and the (b) equations concern the other - more
often chosen - B/C player. Note first that adding the emotions marginally improves
the estimation whereas removing interaction success has no significant effect. Again,
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Table 7: Determinants of the final angles of more often chosen B/C
players in CC (Seemingly unrelated regressions)
More often chosen B/C player towards A (#a equations) and
less often (#b equations) chosen B/C player
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Initial .2440 .5245∗∗ .2067 .4774∗∗ .2435 .4774∗∗
angle (.113) (.000) (.109) (.000) (.063) (.000)
Interaction .0036∗ .0021
success (.013) (.165)
sadness -5.113∗ -.7943 -5.269∗ -.7943
(.030) (.667) (.031) (.667)
Fear -.3257 -3.404∗ .2815 -3.404∗
(.885) (.049) (.902) (.049)
Guilt 4.170 1.452 4.984∗ 1.452
(.066) (.397) (.028) (.397)
Surprise -3.779∗ -1.090 -3.987∗ -1.090
(.031) (.426) (.028) (.426)
Contempt -.8791 -1.013 -1.742 -1.013
(.582) (.379) (.253) (.379)
Happiness -4,712 -4.325∗ -4.388 -4.325∗
(.056) (.025) (.085) (.025)
Constant -12.11 2.718 39.06∗ 35.12∗∗ 49.82∗∗ 35.12∗∗
(.186) (.422) (.025) (.004) (.002) (.004)
R2 .2587 .4640 .5380 .6232 .5029 .6232
Na 25 25 25 25 25 25
Model comparisons Model 1 vs Model 2 Model 2 vs Model 3
LR χ2 18.91 1.86
p-value .0908 .1732
Note:
∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level. a one
missing initial angle observation due to technical problems in one session. The two
observations in which A has chosen the same partner for all 30 rounds are excluded.
p−values between parentheses.
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Table 8: Determinants of the final angles of less often chosen B/C
players in CC (Seemingly unrelated regressions)
Less often chosen B/C player towards A (#a equations) and
more often (#b equations) chosen B/C player
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Initial .6751∗∗ .1051 .5201∗∗ .1283 .5193∗∗ .1283
angle (.000) (.146) (.000) (.155) (.000) (.155)
Interaction .0035 .0007
success (.220) (.748)
Sadness 2.143 -.8394 2.095 -.8394
(.208) (.592) (.220) (.592)
fear -3.118 -.6637 -3.260 -.6637
(.135) (.724) (.112) (.724)
Guilt -.3687 -.5459 -.2677 -.5459
(.817) (.705) (.865) (.705)
Surprise -.7733 -1.756 -.6951 -1.756
(.618) (.214) (.652) (.214)
Contempt -3.920∗∗ 2.111 -4.010∗∗ 2.111
(.009) (.119) (.007) (.119)
Happiness -.8542 .3309 -.9166 .3309
(.646) (.846) (.622) (.846)
Constant -15.14∗∗ 4.097 8.776 8.570 10.34 8.570
(.005) (.063) (.378) (.284) (.236) (.284)
R2 .6479 .0781 .8071 .1832 .8101 .1832
Na 25 25 25 25 25 25
Model comparisons Model 1 vs Model 2 Model 2 vs Model 3
LR χ2 19.51 .1800
p-value .0769 .6700
Note:
∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level. a one
missing initial angle observation due to technical problems in one session. The two
observations in which A has chosen the same partner for all 30 rounds are excluded.
p−values between parentheses.
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the (a) and (b) regressions show very different results. In all model specifications all
regression coefficients regarding the other B/C player are never significantly different
from zero. Hence, the final angle of the less often chosen B/C players towards their more
often chosen counterparts seems to be erratic. In contrast, concerning the A player the
regression results are very clear-cut. Next to the initial disposition towards others it
is the negative emotion contempt which explains the final angle very well (R2 > .80
for models 2 and 3). Interaction success (earnings over plays) has no direct influence
on the final angle towards the A player (see models 1 and 2 in Table 8). There is also
no indirect influence via the emotions because - for the less often chosen B/C players
- none of them is correlated with interaction success (see Table 13 in the Appendix).23
We summarize the main observations concerning the determinants of disposition
towards others after the experience in the incomplete contract game in the following
result.
Result 7 For the final disposition towards others we find that:
A. For players in the NCC it depends only indirectly on interaction success, mediated
by emotions.
B. For the A players in the CC it does not depend on interaction success but is strongly
influenced by the emotional state.
C. For the more often chosen B/C players in the CC the final disposition towards the
A players is influenced by interaction success and also by the emotional state, which
also influences the final disposition towards the less often chosen B/C players.
D. For the less often chosen B/C players the final disposition towards the A players
is independent of interaction success but is strongly influenced by the negative emotion
contempt, while with respect to the more often chosen B/C players none of the variables
has a significant effect.
23One might argue that the desire to reduce earnings inequalities drives the final disposition of the
less often chosen B/C players towards their richer A players. To test this we have also run regressions
where we included ‘total earnings across rounds’ as a measure of interaction success and/or the ‘relative
total earnings across rounds of the less often chosen B/C player with respect to the A and the more often
chosen B/C players’ as explanatory variables. It turns out that these variables are never significant and
that the emotion ‘contempt’ stays significant at the 1% level in all alternative specifications. Hence,
for our results the explanation that less often chosen B/C players punish A players because of earnings
inequalities seems to have no bite.
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From Section 3.2 we know that general subjective well-being and the emotional state
of players strongly depend on the competitiveness of the institution players participate
in as well as their position in the competitive environment. We have also seen that
interaction success, measured by earnings, is insufficient to explain these differences.
The above result shows that the emotional state rather than pure monetary gains
are determining behavior after the experience with the incomplete contract game. In
summary, this leads to the following regularity.
Regularity 3 Mediated by the emotional state, the experience with competition as such
and the role people are immersed in in the competitive environment are important deter-
minants of the disposition towards others, while interaction success plays only a minor
role.
4 Final Comments
We find that competition matters, but in a very different way than is typically assumed
in economics. In our experimental exchange environment with incomplete contracts
competition does neither enhance efficiency nor does it increase the earnings of the
short side of the exchange relation. It does have positive effects on the subjective
(experienced) well-being of people on the short side. However, competition has hidden
costs that are related to people’s emotional reaction to lack of control and the possibility
of exclusion from trade. Being exposed to the competitive environment lowers subjec-
tive well-being and triggers negative emotions for those on the long side. Competition
has also adverse effects on the behavioral disposition towards those interacted with.
Experience with competition appears to decrease the subsequent willingness to help.
This effect is strongest for those who are frequently excluded. Importantly, these effects
can not be explained by earnings differences generated during the interaction alone. In
summary, competition does not show up as a very positive force in our experiment.
One can speculate about potential longer term effects of our findings. The kind
of competition we study clearly deteriorates the social relations between interaction
partners and considerably depresses the subjective well-being of those on the long side
of exchange who are often excluded from interaction. These facts may lead to the
obstruction of future cooperation. Note, that the formation of mostly stable bilateral
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relations can not completely solve this problem. In most competitive situations bilateral
relations necessarily imply the exclusion of some parties from materially beneficial
interactions. Additionally, in a dynamic society established bilateral relations will not
hold forever. When interactions between new partners have to take place, they may
bring together parties with a negative disposition towards others. In addition, the
subjective well-being of those parties that have previously been frequently excluded
from the interaction may be low. This in turn may feed back to individuals’ behavior
with possibly adverse effects on efficiency.
In our experiment the interplay between psychological effects and allocative and
distributional choices turns out to be significant. The results observed in our experi-
ment indicate that people’s motivation and the economic environment they are acting
in are not independent from each other. It would be interesting and important to ex-
amine if such effects are long lasting and if they indeed spill-over to other economic
environments. If this turned out to be true, it would would affect the very basis of
how economists think about competitive interaction. Our study may serve as a basis
of research in this direction.
In a more general sense, our evidence is in favor of the view that socio-psychological
influences and those aspects of human interaction mostly related to material welfare
and pecuniary incentives can (and should) not always be kept apart or disentangled.
Granovetter (1985) refers to this as the embeddedness of economic activity in social
relations. The interpersonal rivalry implied by competition can hurt the social relations
which are necessary for the successful pursuit of material wealth. Our results add to
but are different from the criticism of market economies put forward by Lane (1991 and
2000). His point is, in essence, that in market economies people are drawn into striv-
ing too much for material things at the expense of companionship. Our contribution
consists in providing evidence of the social and affective costs of competition as such.
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Appendix
Table 9: Partner switching behavior and choices of A
choice of A in t− 1
choice 0 10
of partner
of A in t− 1 choice of A in t choice of A in t
0 10 Total 0 10 Total
0 67 14 81 14 25 39
(n=135) (n=26) (n=161) (n=35) (n=39) (n=74)
10 30 10 40 11 28 39
(n=63) (n=30) (n=93) (n=31) (n=424) (n=455)
Total 97 24 121 25 53 78
(n=198) (n=56) (n=254) (n=66) (n=463) (n=529)
Note: The entries depict the absolute frequencies of partner switching by A in period
t in dependence of the choice of the partner of A in t− 1 and of A himself in t− 1 and
t. Total number of observations in parentheses.
Table 10: Reciprocal behavior in choices
treatment
choice.
of partner NCC CC
of A in t− 1 choice of A in t choice of A in t
0 10 Total 0 10 Total
0 .797 .203 .723 .277
243 62 305 170 65 235
10 .074 .926 .172 .828
55 684 739 94 454 548
treatment
NCC CC
choice choice of
of A in t− 1 choice of B in t chosen B/C in t− 1
0 10 Total 0 10 Total
0 .854 .146 .701 .299
239 41 280 178 76 254
10 .109 .891 .138 .862
83 681 764 73 456 529
Note: Entries depict the relative and absolute frequencies of (non-)
cooperative choices by A (B/C) in period t in dependence of the choices
of the partner of A (B/C) in t− 1.
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Table 11: Subjective well-being as a function of interaction
success - Players in NCC (OLS regressions)
Subjective well-being (emotion score) of players as a function
of interaction success (total earnings over plays) with each other
sub-sample of observations
with all circle test data full sample
coef. st.err. # obs.and fit coef. st.err. # obs.and fit
general well-being
interaction success .00099∗∗ .00019 n = 52 .00110∗∗ .00015 n = 72
(0.000) (0.000)
constant -1.0332 1.4152 adj. R2 = .35 -1.8954 1.1595 adj. R2 = .42
(0.469) (0.107)
sadness
interaction success -.00040∗∗ .00011 n = 52 -.00037∗∗ .00010 n = 72
(0.001) (0.000)
constant 5.10555∗∗ .86924 adj. R2 = .18 4.8796∗∗ .77536 adj. R2 = .15
(0.000) (0.000)
happiness
interaction success .00062∗∗ .00013 n = 52 .00065∗∗ .00010 n = 72
(0.000) (0.000)
constant -.60097 .96617 adj. R2 = .31 -.81259 .79657 adj. R2 = .36
(0.537) (0.311)
shame
interaction success .00003 .00012 n = 52 -.00010 .00011 n = 72
(0.788) (0.378)
constant 1.5732 .88496 adj. R2 = −.02 2.5459∗∗ .83279 adj. R2 = −.00
(0.082) (0.003)
pride
interaction success .00028 .00015 n = 52 .00035∗∗ .00013 n = 72
(0.062) (0.009)
constant 1.6260 1.1052 adj. R2 = .05 1.1409 .98456 adj. R2 = .08
(0.147) (0.251)
fear
interaction success .00001 .00009 n = 52 -.00005 .00009 n = 72
(0.944) (0.604)
constant 1.5286∗ .69377 adj. R2 = −.02 1.9544∗∗ .67129 adj. R2 = −.01
(0.032) (0.005)
envy
interaction success -.00041∗ .00017 n = 52 -.00037∗ .00014 n = 72
(0.022) (0.011)
constant 5.5970∗∗ 1.3015 adj. R2 = .08 5.2223∗∗ 1.0892 adj. R2 = .08
(0.000) (0.000)
continues on next page
Note:
∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level; p−values between parentheses.
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Table 11: continued
Subjective well-being (emotion score) of players as a function
of interaction success (total earnings over plays) with each other
sub-sample of observations
with all circle test data full sample
coef. st.err. # obs.and fit coef. st.err. # obs.and fit
relief
interaction success .00024 .00016 n = 52 .00024 .00014 n = 72
(0.141) (0.097)
constant 1.5263 1.2398 adj. R2 = .02 1.6777 1.0843 adj. R2 = .03
(0.224) (0.126)
anger
interaction success -.00072∗∗ .00016 n = 52 -.00067∗∗ .00014 n = 72
(0.000) (0.000)
constant 8.0992∗∗ 1.2272 adj. R2 = .27 7.8398∗∗ 1.0599 adj. R2 = .24
(0.000) (0.000)
joy
interaction success .00065∗∗ .00015 n = 52 .00065∗∗ .00012 n = 72
(0.000) (0.000)
constant -1.0619 1.1228 adj. R2 = .27 -1.1614 .94771 adj. R2 = .27
(0.349) (0.224)
guilt
interaction success .00020 .00012 n = 52 .00014 .00009 n = 72
(0.096) (0.149)
constant .26935 .90073 adj. R2 = .04 .64609 .72089 adj. R2 = .02
(0.766) (0.373)
irritation
interaction success -.00084∗∗ .00017 n = 52 -.00083∗∗ .00014 n = 72
(0.000) (0.000)
constant 9.4749∗∗ 1.2504 adj. R2 = .33 9.5560∗∗ 1.0735 adj. R2 = .33
(0.000) (0.000)
surprise
interaction success -.00031 .00019 n = 52 -.00037∗ .00016 n = 72
(0.113) (0.022)
constant 5.5645∗∗ 1.4368 adj. R2 = .03 6.1039∗∗ 1.2281 adj. R2 = .06
(0.000) (0.000)
contempt
interaction success -.00049∗∗ .00017 n = 52 -.00034∗ .00015 n = 72
(0.005) (0.023)
constant 6.0928∗∗ 1.2599 adj. R2 = .13 4.9968∗∗ 1.1188 adj. R2 = .06
(0.000) (0.000)
Note:
∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level; p−values between parentheses.
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Table 12: Subjective well-being as a function of interaction
success - A players in CC (OLS regressions)
Subjective well-being (emotion score) of A-players as a function
of interaction success (total earnings over plays) with
more often chosen B/C-player less often chosen B/C-player
coef. st.err. # obs.and fit coef. st.err. # obs.and fit
general well-being
interaction success .00030 .00015 n = 27 -.00036 .00026 n = 25
(.054) (0.181)
constant 5.9882∗∗ .95753 adj. R2 = .11 8.3206∗∗ .47557 adj. R2 = .04
(.000) (.000)
sadness
interaction success -.00031∗ .00014 n = 27 .00046 .00025 n = 25
(.041) (.080)
constant 3.8615∗∗ .93487 adj. R2 = .12 1.3413∗∗ .45335 adj. R2 = .09
(.000) (.007)
happiness
interaction success .00021 .00011 n = 27 -.00024 .00018 n = 25
(.065) (.202)
constant 3.7184∗∗ .70956 adj. R2 = .10 5.3046∗∗ .33067 adj. R2 = .03
(.000) (.000)
shame
interaction success -.00013 .00013 n = 27 .00024 .00022 n = 25
(.330) (.271)
constant 2.8906∗∗ .81626 adj. R2 = −.00 1.7322∗∗ .38859 adj. R2 = .01
(.002) (.000)
pride
interaction success -.00035 .00021 n = 27 .00068∗ .00032 n = 25
(.096) (.048)
constant 5.9843∗∗ 1.3269 adj. R2 = .07 2.8316∗∗ .58335 adj. R2 = .12
(.000) (.000)
fear
interaction success -.00007 .00011 n = 27 .00004 .00020 n = 25
(.510) (.835)
constant 1.9471∗ .72445 adj. R2 = −.02 1.4611∗∗ .35117 adj. R2 = −.04
(.013) (.000)
envy
interaction success -.00015 .00014 n = 27 .00005 .00025 n = 25
(.297) (.853)
constant 2.7862∗∗ .91073 adj. R2 = .01 1.8539∗∗ .44352 adj. R2 = −.04
(.005) (.000)
continues on next page
Note:
∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level; p−values between parentheses.
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Table 12: continued
Subjective well-being (emotion score) of A-players as a function
of interaction success (total earnings over plays) with
more often chosen B/C-player less often chosen B/C-player
coef. st.err. # obs.and fit coef. st.err. # obs.and fit
relief
interaction success .00006 .00020 n = 27 -.00007 .00031 n = 25
(.749) (.821)
constant 3.1930∗ 1.2812 adj. R2 = −.04 3.6598∗∗ .54902 adj. R2 = −.04
(.020) (.000)
anger
interaction success -.00040∗∗ .00014 n = 27 .00053∗ .00026 n = 25
(.009) (.048)
constant 4.5685∗∗ .92029 adj. R2 = .21 1.3989∗∗ .45970 adj. R2 = .12
(.000) (.006)
joy
interaction success .00015 .00012 n = 27 -.00031 .00019 n = 25
(.230) (.117)
constant 3.8050∗∗ .79064 adj. R2 = .02 5.1203∗∗ .34036 adj. R2 = .06
(.000) (.000)
guilt
interaction success -.00004 .00015 n = 27 .00035 .00023 n = 25
(.786) (.134)
constant 2.2581∗ .97776 adj. R2 = −.04 1.3794∗∗ .40579 adj. R2 = .06
(.029) (.002)
irritation
interaction success -.00030 .00018 n = 27 .00044 .00031 n = 25
(.097) (.160)
constant 4.1570∗∗ 1.1430 adj. R2 = .07 1.7279∗∗ .54858 adj. R2 = .04
(.001) (.004)
surprise
interaction success .00003 .00021 n = 27 -.00019 .00035 n = 25
(.889) (.591)
constant 3.1865∗ 1.3573 adj. R2 = −.04 3.7136∗∗ .63289 adj. R2 = −.03
(.027) (.000)
contempt
interaction success -.00011 .00018 n = 27 .00005 .00031 n = 25
(.534) (.883)
constant 2.7438∗ 1.1645 adj. R2 = −.02 2.0538∗∗ .55990 adj. R2 = −.04
(.027) (.001)
Note:
∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level; p−values between parentheses.
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Table 13: Subjective well-being as a function of interaction
success - B/C players in CC (OLS regressions)
Subjective well-being (emotion score) of more and less often chosen
chosen B/C-player as a function of interaction success
(total earnings over plays) with the A-player
more often chosen B/C-player less often chosen B/C-player
coef. st.err. # obs.and fit coef. st.err. # obs.a and fit
general well-being
interaction success .00063∗∗ .00017 n = 27 .00026 .00039 n = 25
(.001) (.522)
constant 2.3736∗ 1.0682 adj. R2 = .33 3.2700∗∗ .70712 adj. R2 = −.02
(.036) (.000)
sadness
interaction success -.00014 .00012 n = 27 -.00041 .00035 n = 25
(.272) (.263)
constant 3.4984∗∗ .75752 adj. R2 = .01 4.5419∗∗ .63908 adj. R2 = .01
(.000) (.000)
happiness
interaction success .00024∗ .00011 n = 27 -.00007 .00029 n = 25
(.036) (.803)
constant 2.8734∗∗ .66737 adj. R2 = .13 3.1918∗∗ .52287 adj. R2 = −.04
(.000) (.000)
shame
interaction success .00001 .00009 n = 27 -.00041 .00032 n = 25
(.903) (.216)
constant 1.4757∗ .53425 adj. R2 = −.04 2.8387∗∗ .57404 adj. R2 = .03
(.011) (.000)
pride
interaction success .00009 .00012 n = 27 -.00011 .00028 n = 25
(.465) (.689)
constant 3.4892∗∗ .73661 adj. R2 = −.02 2.8954∗∗ .51104 adj. R2 = .01
(.000) (.000)
fear
interaction success .00009 .00011 n = 27 -.00048 .00031 n = 25
(.431) (.135)
constant 1.5168 .69523 adj. R2 = −.01 2.6978∗∗ .56228 adj. R2 = .06
(.039) (.000)
envy
interaction success -.00037∗ .00015 n = 27 .00001 .00037 n = 25
(.021) (.988)
constant 5.2923∗∗ .93491 adj. R2 = .16 3.4717∗∗ .66600 adj. R2 = −.04
(.000) (.000)
continues on next page
Note:
a in two cases one of the B/C-players was never chosen as interaction partner; ∗∗ significant at the 1 percent
level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level; p−values between parentheses.
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Table 13: continued
Subjective well-being (emotion score) of more and less often chosen
chosen B/C-player as a function of interaction success
(total earnings over plays) with the A-player
more often chosen B/C-player less often chosen B/C-player
coef. st.err. # obs.and fit coef. st.err. # obs.a and fit
relief
interaction success .00028∗ .00013 n = 27 -.00029 .00032 n = 25
(.046) (.375)
constant 2.0738 .83139 adj. R2 = .12 2.9562∗∗ .56908 adj. R2 = −.01
(.020) (.000)
anger
interaction success -.00048∗∗ .00012 n = 27 -.00025 .00043 n = 25
(.001) (.571)
constant 5.5963∗∗ .78188 adj. R2 = .34 4.7173∗∗ .77430 adj. R2 = −.03
(.000) (.000)
joy
interaction success .00033∗∗ .00011 n = 27 -.00000 .00032 n = 25
(.005) (.995)
constant 2.2454∗∗ .67747 adj. R2 = .24 2.5631∗∗ .57868 adj. R2 = −.04
(.003) (.000)
guilt
interaction success .00007 .00011 n = 27 .00008 .00034 n = 25
(.524) (.804)
constant 1.5983∗ .69646 adj. R2 = −.02 2.2507∗∗ .60642 adj. R2 = −.04
(.030) (.001)
irritation
interaction success -.00062∗∗ .00012 n = 27 -.00009 .00048 n = 25
(.000) (.849)
constant 7.0144∗∗ .76545 adj. R2 = .49 4.4201∗∗ .85722 adj. R2 = −.04
(.000) (.000)
surprise
interaction success -.00019 .00015 n = 27 -.00012 .00041 n = 25
(.221) (.772)
constant 4.5733∗∗ .92987 adj. R2 = .02 4.4257∗∗ .74689 adj. R2 = −.04
(.000) (.000)
contempt
interaction success -.00055∗∗ .00017 n = 27 -.00061 .00046 n = 25
(.003) (.195)
constant 6.3864∗∗ 1.0438 adj. R2 = .28 4.5984∗∗ .82935 adj. R2 = .03
(.000) (.000)
Note:
a in two cases one of the B/C-players was never chosen as interaction partner; ∗∗ significant at the 1 percent
level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level; p−values between parentheses.
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